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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]here have been great advances in [our immigration] laws [that pro-
tect] lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) immigrants,"' as well
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1. Hollis V. Pfitsch, Homosexuality in Asylum and Constitutional Law: Rhetoric ofActs
and Identity, 15 LAw& SEX. 59, 59 (2006).
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as laws "in regard to human rights violations inflicted on women."'2 When
the United States of America came into being with the signing of the Decla-
ration of Independence in 1776, there were no immigration laws.' There
were no such laws for almost 100 years.4 In 1875, the first immigration law
was passed by Congress and Americans have since been debating who
should be allowed to legally immigrate to the United States and who should
be excluded.5
One of our earliest immigration laws passed by "Congress excluded
lesbian and gay[s]" from legal immigration channels.6 The law, based on a
belief that homosexuality was a medical condition, existed on the books until
1990. 7 "Also in 1990, the [Board of Immigration Appeals] (BIA) affirmed
an immigration judge's [(IJ's)] decision to withhold [deportation] of a gay
Cuban marielito in [the case of] In re Toboso-Alfonso."8 This "was the first
known instance in U.S. immigration law where a homosexual was cast as a
member of a particular social group, namely that of Cuban gays, and permit-
ted to successfully allege persecution on that basis so as to conform with the
statutory definition" found in the law. 9 "Fidel Armando Tobosco [sic] said
that because he was gay, he was sentenced to 60 days in a forced labor camp
,"10
2. Marissa Farrone, Opening the Doors to Women? An Examination of Recent Devel-
opments in Asylum and Refugee Law, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 661, 661 (2006).
3. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 124 (3d ed.
2002).
4. Id. at 124-25.
5. Id. at 125. The "1875 statute barring convicts and prostitutes was quickly followed
by the adoption of the first general immigration statute in 1882. The 1882 Act imposed a head
tax of 50 cents and excluded idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to become a public
charge." Id. This Act excluded the Chinese from immigrating to the U.S. Id.
6. Alan G. Bennett, Note, The "Cure" That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum
and the Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 279, 279 (1999).
7. Id. at 280. "The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first U.S. law to exclude lesbian
and gay aliens from entry into the United States. Congress excluded lesbians and gay men
because of the medical and psychiatric communities' belief that homosexuality was a dis-
ease." Id. at 279. "Congress ended the general exclusion of lesbian and gay aliens in 1990,
[which has allowed] refugees to escape... sexual orientation-based persecution in their home
countries." Id. at 280. "The statute simply eliminated 'sexual deviants' from its list of classes
of excludable aliens." Id. at 280 n.5.
8. Robert C. Leitner, Comment, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Adjudica-
tory System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 679, 686 (2004). See also
In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 823 (B.I.A. 1990).
9. Leitner, supra note 8, at 686.
10. Monica Saxena, More than Mere Semantics: The Case for an Expansive Definition
of Persecution in Sexual Minority Asylum Claims, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 331, 342 (2006).
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Later, at the time of the Mariel boatlift, he was threatened by the Cuban
government "that if he did not leave [Cuba] immediately he would have to
serve four years in ... [prison] for being a homosexual."" "The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that homosexuality should not
be considered a particular social group .... 2 This argument was rejected
by the BIA. 3 Four years later, then "Attorney General Janet Reno issued an
order declaring that Tobosco-Alfonso [sic] was to be considered precedent in
all proceedings involving the 'same issue or issues."" 4
"[I]n regard to human rights violations inflicted on women, courts have
recognized new categories of 'social groups,' one of the grounds on which
asylum may be granted or deportation withheld. The consequence of these
decisions has been that more women may be granted [asylum] in the United
States."'" The seminal case in this area is In re Fauziya Kasinga.16 In Kas-
inga, the BIA reversed an immigration court's denial of asylum for a young
Togolese woman who fled her homeland to escape female genital mutilation
(FGM).17 In its opinion the BIA held:
"the practice of female genital mutilation, which results in perma-
nent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life-
threatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of persecu-
tion." The court also found that "young women who are members
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of northern Togo who have not
been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that
tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a
'particular social group' within.., the Immigration and National-
ity Act."' 8
As a result of this decision, it has become possible, in very particular
cases, that women fearing the brutality of genital mutilation in their home
country may apply for and "be granted asylum in the United States based on
11. Id. at 342-43.
12. Id. at 343.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Farrone, supra note 2, at 661.
16. 211. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
17. Id. at 368. See also Irena Lieberman, Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based Vio-
lence and Asylum Jurisprudence, HuM. RTS., Summer 2002, at 9-10.
18. Eva N. Juncker, Comment, A Juxtaposition of U.S. Asylum Grants to Women Fleeing
Female Genital Mutilation and to Gays and Lesbians Fleeing Physical Harm: The Need to
Promulgate an INS Regulation for Women Fleeing Female Genital Mutilation, 4 J. INT'L
LEGAL STuD. 253, 259 (1998) (quoting Fauziya Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 357) (footnotes
omitted).
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[their very] reasonable fear of persecution."' 9 The BIA immediately desig-
nated the decision as precedent to be followed by all 179 immigration courts
in the country.2°
The expansion of grants of political asylum, based on sexual orientation
and gender based violence, is a welcomed trend in our law because we, as a
society, have come to realize that basic human rights require justice even for
those who are persecuted in their country of origin on account of the their
sexual identity, their sexual conduct, or as a result of gender violence. Asy-
lum seeks to uphold individual human dignity in the face of persecution in
one's country of origin. 21 This is a welcomed expansion of our basic and
traditional immigration laws. Our basic immigration system is based on a
complicated set of quantitative and qualitative laws passed by Congress over
the years regulating and limiting legal immigration to our country. Our cur-
rent immigration law was passed by Congress in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA), as amended, first passed in 1952,22 and is codified in the
United States Code. 23 An integral part of our immigration law is the imple-
mentation of rules of human rights allowing those prosecuted in their home-
land to seek protection in the United States. "Asylum and human rights doc-
trines are intertwined in that how a country defines persecution reflects its
beliefs about what constitutes human rights violations."
24
Harassment and abuse of LGBT persons, as well as persecution of
women who are victims of gender violence, have become "increasingly ac-
cepted as grounds for legal asylum in the United States., 25 This is so despite
the fact that the country is experiencing a period "of conservative judicial
activism, fear [of] HIV/AIDS, . . . and increased scrutiny" of all who wish to
legally enter the United States.26 For persecuted LGBT persons and women
19. Id. at 259-60.
20. Id. at 260.
21. See John A. Russ IV, The Gap Between Asylum Ideals and Domestic Reality: Evalu-
ating Human Rights Conditions for Gay Americans by the United States' Own Progressive
Asylum Standards, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29, 47 (1998).
22. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). See also DAVID
WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 15
(5th ed. 2005). "The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) consolidated previous
immigration laws into one coordinated statute. As amended, the 1952 Act provides the foun-
dation for immigration law in effect today." WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra, at 15. The
1952 Act was passed by Congress overriding President Truman's veto. Id.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
24. Russ, supra note 21, at 46.
25. Pamela Constable, Persecuted Gays Seek Refuge in US., WASH. POST, July 10, 2007,
at A6.
26. Id.
(Vol. 32
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subjected to persecution because of their gender, such asylum protection
represents recognition of their basic rights as human beings.27
This article is written to analyze the myriad of problems in obtaining
justice in our asylum system with respect to the grants of asylum on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender violence. It is also written to expose the
need for better-trained and more sensitive immigration judges, the need for
more consistency in defining and interpreting our asylum laws, and the need
for the Department of Homeland Security to formulate policies that will
guarantee uniformly just results for those escaping persecution. Part II will
briefly explain the history of how asylum became a part of United States law
and discuss immigration court proceedings, appeal, and review. This section
will also provide up-to-date statistical information concerning grants of asy-
lum. Part III of this article will discuss the difficulty of adjudicating asylum
cases in a uniform way because of the lack of definitions of certain statutory
language, such as the term "persecution." It will explore splits in the United
States Circuit Courts, which interpret asylum law and discuss why there is
little precedent inherent in the system of asylum.
Part IV will discuss two recent asylum decisions concerning sexual ori-
entation and gender violence, which will demonstrate the difficulties and
biases in our system of asylum. The two cases are out of the Ninth Circuit.
The first, Ali v. Ashcrof, 28 involved a Somali woman whose brother-in-law
was shot and killed in her home while she was being raped by members of a
militia group of a rival clan who opposed Ali's political beliefs.29 She and
her family were forced to flee Somalia.3° The court upheld her claim of asy-
lum finding that she was persecuted on account of "her political opinion and
... her membership in a particular social group."31 The second case, Karou-
ni v. Gonzales,3 2 involved an "outed" gay, Shi'ite Muslim man from Leba-
non, afflicted with AIDS, who was able to reverse the lower court's finding
that his fear of future persecution was not well-founded.33 Analysis will
demonstrate, because of the way asylum claims are adjudicated, the outcome
of both these cases may have been different if they had been brought in cir-
cuits other than the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In some circuits, Ms.
27. See GuY S. GOODWiN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
564 (3d ed. 2007). The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Article 14 recognizes
that "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion." Id.
28. 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005).
29. Id. at 782-83.
30. Id. at 783.
31. Id. at 787.
32. 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005).
33. See id. at 1166-69, 1179.
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Ali's rape may have been determined to be a case of rape and burglary not
amounting to persecution under the statutory requirements of our asylum
system. Whereas in other circuits, Mr. Karouni may have been found not
"gay" enough to have received a grant of asylum. Part V of this article con-
cludes that there is a need to harmonize the splits in circuit interpretation of
asylum terms and concepts. Also, the BIA should publish more of its cases
and designate them for precedential treatment each year in order to gain
more uniform adjudication by immigration judges. The author suggests that
the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association work together
to codify asylum law regulations that can be uniformly interpreted by immi-
gration judges, practitioners, and law teachers.
II. BACKGROUND ON ASYLUM
A. History
International protection efforts and measures for refugees were first ini-
tiated after World War II by the creation of the UN Convention of 195 1.
4
These protections were later expanded in the Protocol Relating to Refugees
passed in 1967." 5 Under the 1951 Convention, a "refugee" is:
[A]ny person who.., owing to a well-founded fear of being per-
secuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not hav-
ing a nationality and being outside the country of his former habit-
ual residence ... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
36
The 1951 Convention provided protection for World War II refugees.3"
Future refugees were included in the 1967 Protocol.38 The United States
34. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force April 22, 1954) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
35. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
36. 1951 Convention, supra note 34, art. 1A(2).
37. See id. pmbl. See also Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government:
Racial and Sexual Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEX. 135, 139
(2006).
38. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 35, pmbl. See also Morgan, supra note 37, at 139.
[Vol. 32
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acceded to the Protocol in 1968, 3 9 but Congress did not enact its own Refu-
gee Act until 1980.40 In that year Congress adopted the 1967 Protocol as
part of the immigration law at section 1 101(a)(42) of the INA.4 ' This provi-
sion provides "that an applicant for asylum: 1) must have 'a well founded
fear of persecution;' 2) the fear must be based on past persecution or the risk
of future persecution; [and] 3) the persecution must be 'on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.,,
42
B. Eligibility for Asylum
It should be understood that the concept of asylum provides a legal ave-
nue for both documented and undocumented aliens to obtain relief from per-
secution in their home country. Under our law such persecution must be on
account of one of the protected grounds mentioned in the statute: "race, re-
ligion, nationality, political opinion, [or] membership in a 'particular social
group."'' 43 As a result not all those fleeing some form of hardship in their
home countries are eligible for asylum. Their claim must be on account of
one of the statutory grounds.
"An asylum request is automatically considered an application for an al-
ternat[e] claim [of relief known as] withholding of removal." Both forms
39. 1967 Protocol, supra note 35, 19 U.S.T. at 6223.
40. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. See also Arwen Swink, Note,
Queer Refuge: A Review of the Role of Country Condition Analysis in Asylum Adjudications
for Members of Sexual Minorities, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 251, 254 (2006).
41. Refugee Act § 201(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000)).
42. Morgan, supra note 37, at 140 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). An alien will be
considered a refugee if she has suffered persecution in the past on account of one of the statu-
tory grounds or if she can show an objectively reasonable fear of such persecution in the fu-
ture. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987). If the alien establishes past
persecution, moreover, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of granting asylum. Dra-
ganova v. INS, 82 F.3d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). Yet that presumption may be overcome by
evidence suggesting that conditions in the alien's home country have changed to such an
extent that she no longer is in danger of persecution there. Id. See also 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b)(3)(ii) (2007).
43. Joseph Landau, "Soft Immutability" and "Imputed Gay Identity": Recent Develop-
ments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
237, 240 (2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)).
44. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)). This provision of the law is found in § 1231 of
the United States Code and was formerly known as withholding of deportation. 8 U.S.C. §
1231 (b)(3)(A); April E. Schwendler, In the Matter of Pearson: Partisan Politics and Political
Pressure Contravene Congressional Intent, 10 PACE INT'L L. REv. 607, 613 n.20 (1998). The
amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 in the 1996 Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act replaced former hearings known as deportation
2008]
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of relief require the claimant to demonstrate a certain quantum of persecution
that the individual suffered in his or her home country or would suffer if re-
turned there, and both require a "nexus" between the persecution and one of
the protected grounds.45
"Asylum and withholding of removal appear nearly identical but have
important differences . ... "" "[A]sylum is subject to" the discretion of the
Attorney General of the United States.47 "[W]ithholding of removal, [if]
proven, is a mandatory form of relief."48 A person granted asylum may be
eligible for permanent residency in the United States after one year as an
asylee.49 "[M]ost litigants prefer asylum. 50
Withholding of removal guarantees only that the person will not be
forcibly returned to his or her country of origin and does not preclude the
possibility of being removed to a third country.5' "The applicable standard
of proof is also higher [in a] withholding of removal" than in an asylum
grant.5" In order to obtain withholding or removal, the claimant "must show
a clear probability of persecution."53  The showing for asylum is only a
"'well-founded fear of persecution. ' 4
Applications for asylum are termed either "affirmative" applications or
"defensive" applications. Applicants who are not currently in removal pro-
ceedings may file an affirmative application by mailing a Form 1-589 to a
regional USCI5 5 service center, under the auspices of the Department of
Homeland Security.56 A specialized corps of full time professional asylum
officers receive the applications and interview the applicants.5 7 "Asylum
hearings and exclusion hearings and renamed them both as removal hearings. Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §
308, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-614 to 3009-615. Removal is synonymous with deportation.
See id. The concept of deportation is readily recognized by most people.
45. Landau, supra note 43, at 242.
46. Id. at 241.
47. Id.
48. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(A).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(B).
50. Landau, supra note 43, at 241.
51. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 22, at 328.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 335.
54. Id.
55. This is the abbreviation for the United States "Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Department of Homeland Security. Created in 2003, this bureau houses the princi-
ple services and adjudications functions inherited from the [INS], including asylum officers
and the refugee corps." DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY Xi-
xii (2007). It is sometimes referred to as CIS. Id.
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id.
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officers grant [asylum in] meritorious cases, which initially ran between 15
and 30[%] ... but in recent years have. . . exceeded 40%. They do not deny
the other cases; instead, asylum officers refer them to immigration court"
placing the cases in removal proceedings.58
C. Immigration Court Proceedings, Appeal, and Review
IJ's provide the initial evaluation of all defensive applications for asy-
lum and withholding, and they provide a second review of affirmative appli-
cations referred by asylum officers.59 This allows the case to be heard in
"the more formal setting of the immigration court" where witnesses may be
examined and cross examined by the alien's counsel and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) counsel.60 If removal proceedings are already
underway, the applicant can apply for asylum or withholding only by pre-
senting a defensive application that is heard exclusively by the IJ.
61
At the hearing, the claimant must present evidence to avoid removal.62
The DHS will present evidence and argument in support of its decision to
refuse asylum. 63 Alan G. Bennett, an observer of IJ court procedures, re-
minds us with respect to such proceedings:
Neither state nor federal rules of evidence apply in immigration
proceedings. However, evidence presented must be relevant and
conform to requirements of constitutional due process.
If the [claimant] persuades the [IJ] that she meets the stat-
ute's asylum requirements, the judge [may] grant asylum for an
indefinite time .... In addition, the [claimant's] immediate family
members who are still abroad may join her in the United States...
If, on the other hand, the [IJ denies] the ... asylum request,
she may appeal her case to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
58. Id.
59. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 55, at 80.
60. Id. at 80. ICE-Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of
Homeland Security. See id. at x. "Created in 2003, this bureau houses interior enforcement
functions transferred from the former [INS], including investigations, detention and removal,
[as well as] the trial attorneys who represent the government in immigration court." Id.
61. Id. at 80. Typically the alien makes known at the master calendar hearing-the first
appearance in immigration court--"her wish to seek asylum [or withholding] as a form of
relief from removal, and the judge then grants a specified period of time for [the] completion
of the [Form] 1-589, to be filed with the immigration court." MARTIN ET AL., supra note 55, at
80.
62. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 284.
63. Id.
2008]
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Only one BIA exists and it reviews all appeals from immigration
courts throughout the United States. 64
The BIA is "an administrative appeals tribunal that is part of the Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice (EOIR).
The [BIA] has never been recognized by statute; it is entirely a creature of
the Attorney General's regulations, and the Attorney General appoints its
members." 65 "The BIA has several options [with respect to the appeals]: [i]t
can reject the [claim] on appeal, [it may] remand a case to the [IJ] with in-
structions to follow [an] appropriate course of action, or [it may] grant asy-
lum directly. 66 Although "[t]he BIA hands down a large volume of appel-
late decisions each [year,] [o]nly a small fraction are designated as precedent
decisions for inclusions in the official reports."
67
If the BIA rules against the claim, judicial review may be available to
the claimant by bringing an appeal "to the Federal circuit court of appeals
that has jurisdiction over the area from which the case originated., 6' The
circuits have a number of options with respect to adjudicating the case if an
appeal is taken.69 In some cases, the case may be remanded back to the BIA
with orders to rule in accord with the circuit's findings.7" The Court may
adopt a different rule of the case. 71 "[I]f a circuit court of appeals adopts a
different rule than the BIA, the new rule will be applied within that court's
circuit in future cases. As a result, circuit splits [have arisen] because of
inconsistent rulings among the circuit courts regarding the same legal is-
sue."
72
D. The Statistics on Grants of Asylum
"The [USCIS] ... does not break down its general asylum statistics
according to the basis of the claim, [thus,] there are no official statistics
available to indicate the number of sexual orientation [and gender violence]
claims filed or approved., 73 However, USCIS makes available other infor-
64. Id.
65. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 55, at 83.
66. Bennett, supra note 6, at 285.
67. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 55, at 83.
68. Bennett, supra note 6, at 285.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Morgan, supra note 37, at 141-42.
[Vol. 32
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mation such as "the characteristics of asylum seekers."74 The trend reveals
that grants of asylum are on an upswing.75
The Annual Flow Report of Refugees and Asylees: 2006, published
by the Office of Immigration Statistics of the U.S. Department in May of
2007, reveals, more specifically:
The total number of persons [who were] granted asylum in the Unit-
ed States increased from 25,160 in 2005 to 26,113 in 2006. The
number of persons who were granted asylum affirmatively through
USCIS decreased from 13,423 in 2005 to 12,873 in 2006. Con-
versely, the number of persons granted asylum defensively through
an [i]mmigration [c]ourt increased 13 percent from 11,737 in 2005
to 13,240 in 2006. The leading countries of origin for persons
granted asylum in 2006 were China (21 percent), Haiti (12 percent),
Colombia (11 percent), and Venezuela (5.2 percent). These [four]
countries accounted for the origin of nearly 50 percent of the asy-
lees. 76
74. Id. at 142.
75. See KELLY JEFFERYS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2006
5 (2007), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Refugee AsyleeSec508Compliant.p
df. On November 15, 2007, this author had the opportunity to have a telephonic interview
with Attorney Victoria Neilson, who is the Legal Director of Immigration Equality. "Immi-
gration Equality is a national organization" based in New York City "that works to end dis-
crimination" under U.S. immigration laws for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender immi-
grants and those immigrants who may be HIV positive, and "to help obtain asylum for those
[who are] persecuted in their home country based on their sexual orientation." See generally
Immigration Equality, ImEq Mission,
http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=8 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
Attorney Neilson maintains that her organization has seen an increase of asylum claims based
on sexual orientation over the years since the organization was founded in 1994. Telephone
Interview with Victoria Neilson, Legal Director, Immigration Equality, in New York City,
N.Y. (Nov. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Neilson Interview]. She further advised that in the last year,
Immigration Equality has handled approximately seventy-five GLBT asylum cases and has
had a very high success rate in winning asylum. Id. She also advised that two-thirds of the
cases won were affirmatively filed cases. Id. One-third of the cases won were by a defensive
filing while the claimants were in removal proceedings. Id. She opined that their success rate
in gaining asylum resulted because they do not accept every GLBT case that comes to them.
Id. Instead, they accept only the cases they believe likely will merit a grant of asylum. Neil-
son Interview, supra. It was also her opinion that agencies such as Immigration Equality have
attorneys who prepare their affirmatively filed cases very well with ample documentation. Id.
Such agency attorneys are well prepared for trials in the defensively filed cases. Id. It is her
observation that IJs love to see such level of preparation and trial skill. Id.
76. JEFFERYS, supra note 75, at 5.
The largest percentages of individuals granted asylum [in 2006] affirmatively were living in
Florida (41 percent) and California (24 percent). Sixty-five percent of affirmative asylees were
located in one of these two states. Other major ... states included New York (10 percent),
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Demographic data for 2006 only includes that of affirmative asy-
lees. 77 "Of the 12,873 persons granted asylum affirmatively ... 80 percent
were between the ages of 18 and 54. Fifteen percent were under 18 years of
age, and individuals aged 55 or over accounted for less than 5 percent...
[48] percent were married and 48 percent were single."78
"In 2006, 53 percent of affirmative asylees were male. '79 "According
to 2003 statistics, male applicants filed sixty-two percent of ... new asylum
claims. 80  This indicates that more women appear to have won asylum
claims in the United States if they received 47% of the affirmative applica-
tions in 2006 .8 Nevertheless, "[t]he lack of a [specific] data breakdown" for
claims of asylum for gender based violence
makes it impossible to estimate the number of women who apply for
asylum on [this] basis; however, it is likely that male applicants out-
number [women] . . . by a considerable margin. The fact that...
landmark cases in the area of sexual orientation asylum law [mostly]
deal with male applicants appears to bolster this assertion.
82
"[I]t is likely that a large proportion of sexual orientation" and gender
violence grants of asylum were to people of color.83 The statistics indicate
that in 2006, 21.3% of the asylum claims were granted to people from China,
approximately 11.5% of such claims were awarded to Haitians, 3% went to
Ethiopians, 2.8% to Indonesians, and 2.2% to people from Cameroon."4
III. PROBLEMS IN ADJUDICATIONS
A. Persecution
Problems and inconsistencies prevail in asylum adjudications for a
number of reasons, including lack of definitions for certain statutory words.
"Under both asylum and withholding of deportation, the [claimant] must
Maryland (4.1 percent), Washington (2.1 percent), Virginia (1.9 percent), and Georgia (1.5 per-
cent).
Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Morgan, supra note 37, at 142.
81. See JEFFERYS, supra note 75, at 5.
82. Morgan, supra note 37, at 142-43.
83. Id. at 142.
84. JEFFERYS, supra note 75, at 4.
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show ... that she [has] be[en] persecuted" in the past or will be persecuted in
the future if forced to return to the country of origin. 5 Unfortunately, the
statutes do not offer a definition of "persecution.,"86 "The Ninth Circuit has
[utilized a] very broad [definition of] persecution [as:] 'the infliction of suf-
fering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as offensive.'
'
,
7
"[T]he First Circuit has [held] that a brief detention on several occasions did
not rise to the level of persecution. Rather, persecution 'encompasses more
than threats to life or freedom, but less than mere harassment or annoy-
ance.'
88
"The Third Circuit . . . limits persecution to 'threats to life, confine-
ment, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real
threat to life or freedom."' 89 The Ninth Circuit reminds us "that persecution
must be inflicted either by the government or by groups that the national
government was unwilling or unable to control." 90 "[W]here the source of
the [persecution] is personal hostility, it is . . . considered outside [of] the
realm of 'persecution,' [for statutory purposes] and asylum is denied." 91
This limitation on "persecution may be particularly disadvantageous to
women" who are victims of gender violence in cultures where conditions for
many women "are 'generally harsh,' and their basic rights are likely to be
violated."'92 Such was the situation in the aforementioned case of Ali v. Ash-
croft, the Somali woman who was raped by militia men from a rival clan
who also shot and killed her brother in law.93 The IJ denied her request for
asylum on the ground that such persecution was not a result of her political
opinion, but was instead a routine rape and burglary in a lawless country that
has no functioning civil govenment.94
Analysis of persecution requires the IJ's, the BIA, and the courts to de-
cide the motive of the persecutor. The United States Supreme Court held in
85. Farrone, supra note 2, at 672. See also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2007).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. See also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
I101(a)(42)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000).
87. Farrone, supra note 2, at 672 (quoting Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.
1988)).
88. Id. at 672-73 (quoting Fesseha v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2003)).
89. Id. at 673 (quoting Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001)). In Fatin v.
INS, Fatin was an American educated Iranian woman who feared persecution if she was de-
ported to Iran because she did not want to have to cover herself in a chador in order to go out
in public. 12 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (3d Cir. 1993).
90. Farrone, supra note 2, at 673 (citing McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.
1981)).
91. Id. (citing Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1986)).
92. Id.
93. Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2005).
94. Id. at 785-86.
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INS v. Elias-Zacarias95 that a claimant is not required to provide direct proof
of the persecutor's motivations, but a claimant "must [produce] some evi-
dence of [the persecutors' motive whether] direct or circumstantial., 96 Yet,
the question remains, does persecution require a "punitive intent"? Circuit
courts have been split on this question of "punitive intent." It is a very im-
portant question when analyzing claims of asylum by sexual minorities. The
Ninth Circuit has decided that a broader standard than mere intent to punish
should be utilized in sexual minority cases.97
1. Punitive Intent: The Ninth Circuit
"In 1992, thirty-five-year-old Alla Pitcherskaia, a Russian national,
claimed asylum in [the] United States" on the ground that she was persecuted
in Russia because she was a lesbian. 98 In her trial, she recounted that she had
been arrested several times for such things as "failing to procure required
government permits for a gay-rights protest."99 She suffered further harass-
ment "including forced psychiatric counseling to 'cure' her ... homosexual-
ity. °"' ° Her claim for asylum was denied. 1 ' On appeal to the BIA, her claim
was again denied on the ground
that "even if her testimony is essentially credible," she had failed
to meet her burden in establishing eligibility for relief under...
the Act. The BIA majority concluded that Pitcherskaia had not
been persecuted because, although she had been subjected to in-
voluntary psychiatric treatments, the militia and psychiatric institu-
tions intended to "cure" her, not to punish her, and thus their ac-
tions did not constitute "persecution" within the meaning of the
Act. 102
"The issue on appeal [to the Ninth Circuit] was whether the [INA] re-
quires an applicant to prove that the persecutor 'harbored a subjective intent
to harm or punish when persecuting the victim.""0 3  The court found the
BIA's interpretation of persecution "to be 'arbitrary, capricious, [and] mani-
95. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
96. Id. at 483 (emphasis omitted).
97. Saxena, supra note 10, at 346.
98. Id. at 346-47. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1997)).
99. Saxena, supra note 10, at 346-47; see Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644.
100. Id.
101. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645.
102. Id.
103. Bennett, supra note 6, at 300 (quoting Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643).
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festly contrary to the statute,' [which allowed] the court [to] overrule [the
BIA's] definition and impose another.""
[T]he court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth
Circuit has ever required an asylum applicant to show that her per-
secutor had the intention of inflicting harm or punishment. The
court found that the term "punishment" implied that the perpetrator
believed the victim did some wrong or committed a crime. As a
result, the perpetrator... took action in retribution. Persecution,
on the other hand, only required that the perpetrator caused the
victim suffering or harm. Although many asylum cases involved
situations where the persecutor had a subjective intent to punish,
the court concluded that punitive intent was not required in order
to establish persecution. In clarifying th[e] new legal standard, the
court stated that the definition of persecution is objective. 105
The court reversed the BIA and remanded the case "to the BIA for reconsid-
eration [in light of the] opinion."' 6
2. Punitive Intent: The Fifth Circuit
Although the Ninth Circuit's definition of persecution appears reason-
able, "disagreement[s] exist[] among the Circuits regarding [the] legal is-
sue."' 7 In Pitcherskaia, "the Ninth Circuit recognize[d] persecution as the
infliction of suffering or harm in a way regarded ... offensive to a reason-
able person, [but] the Fifth Circuit finds persecution only when the perpetra-
tor acts with ... intent to punish the victim.' 0 8 In defining its own standard,
the Ninth Circuit, in Pitcherskaia, expressly rejected the punitive intent re-
quirement that the Fifth Circuit applied in Faddoul v. INS. '09
Joseph Faddoul, a thirty-three year old man of Palestinian ancestry who
was born in and raised in Saudi Arabia, "alleged that he was persecuted by
the Saudi Arabian practice ofjus sanguinis, granting citizenship rights only
to residents of Saudi Arabian ancestry.""' 0 He alleged further "that as a non-
citizen living in Saudi Arabia he would be unable to own property or busi-
104. Id. at 300-01. (quoting Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 646).
105. Id. at 301 (citing Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 646-48).
106. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648.
107. Bennett, supra note 6, at 303.
108. Id. (citing Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648 n.9; Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
109. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648 n.9. See also Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 188.
110. Saxena, supra note 10, at 348 (citing Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 188).
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nesses or attend" university and as a result this constituted persecution."1
"The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA's denial of ... Faddoul's asylum [claim]
and held that persecution required both a showing of the infliction of harm
and intent to punish on one of the five protected ... grounds" set out in the
statute.112 In Faddoul, the court noted that he "receive[d] the same rights and
[was] subject to the same [discrimination] as a Saudi-born Egyptian.""' 3 The
court found no evidence that Faddoul had ever been "arrested, detained, in-
terrogated, or . . .harmed" because of his ancestry."14 This distinction in
definitions of persecution may be especially important to sexual minorities.
In many countries, LGBT persons "may be abused because of their sexuality,
[yet] the specific intent to punish is not always present, as in Pitcher-
skaia."115
3. Punitive Intent: The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a position [that may lie
between] the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. In Sivaainkaran v. INS,"
16
the court ruled that an asylum [claimant] could demonstrate perse-
cution by a showing of either the persecutor's motivation to punish
or, more generally, the infliction of harm for one of the five pro-
tected... grounds [of the statute].... The specific use of the term
"punishment" suggests that, for the second requirement, "infliction
of harm," punitive intent is not required .... The Seventh Circuit's
definition comes from a 1970 case in the Sixth Circuit, a jurisdic-
tion that has yet to address the question of punitive intent and uses
the Webster's Dictionary definition of persecution. 
117
111. Id. (citing Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 187).
112. Id. (citing Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 188).
113. Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 189.
114. Id. at 188.
115. Saxena, supra note 10, at 348-49. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9th
Cir. 1997).
116. 972 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1992).
117. Saxena, supra note 10, at 349. "'Persecution' is not defined in the Act, but we have
described it as 'punishment' or 'the infliction of harm' for political, religious, or other reasons
that are offensive." Sivaainkaran, 972 F.2d at 164 n.2.
No doubt 'persecution' is too strong a word to be satisfied by proof of the likelihood of minor
disadvantage or trivial inconvenience. But there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended
section 243(h) to encompass any less than the word 'persecution' ordinarily conveys-the in-
fliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a
way regarded as offensive.
Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 846 (6th Cir. 1970).
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"Future consequences of decisions such as [the one to reverse Pitcher-
skaia's BIA denial of asylum] must be taken into account."' 18
Nations have human rights laws to protect their citizens as well as the citi-
zens of other nations. If people were able to [circumvent] these laws by
simply stating that they were "curing" someone to correct what they saw
as a problem, [such] laws would be totally useless .... If nations [were]
allowed to torture their own people to "cure" sexual orientation, it is im-
possible to know where the line will be drawn .... [T]he inclusion of a
punishment requirement in the determination of whether [there should be
a grant of] asylum based on persecution [should] not [be] feasible [in all
circuits]. 119
B. Lack of Precedent and Published Opinions
Very few IJ court decisions are published each year. As a result of the
lack of published opinions, it is difficult to determine or analyze whether
important precedents have been established in the system. The "decisions
based on sexual orientation [and gender based violence against women] at
the Board of Immigration Appeals, which does publish a significant number
of decisions, indicates that [the] decisions in the United States display sig-
nificant variation .... 
120
Both the claimant and the government can appeal an IJ's trial decision
to the BIA. 121 "The Attorney General is authorized to assign as precedent or
overrule any decision made at the BIA level."' 122 The claimant can then ap-
peal directly to the relevant federal circuit court, whose decision will be
binding on the BIA in that circuit. 12
3
Stuart Grider, another commentator on Immigration Court and BIA pro-
ceedings advises:
The EOIR is authorized to publish its decisions selectively and thereby es-
tablish precedential value for individual BIA level rulings at its discretion.
Few BIA decisions are released; one scholar has reported that only about
fifty of the four thousand decisions made each year by the BIA are actu-
ally published. [A] vast majority of these published cases are decisions
118. Kristie Bowerman, Note, Pitcherskaia v. I.N.S.: The Ninth Circuit Attempts to Cure
the Definition of Persecution, 7 LAw & SEX 101, 110 (1997).
119. Id.
120. Swink, supra note 40, at 263.
121. Stuart Grider, Recent Development, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the
United States-In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35
HARV. INT'L L.J. 213, 215 (1994).
122. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1992)).
123. Id.
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where asylum is denied, which creates a system in which it is nearly im-
possible for the [claimant], or the immigration judge, to discern clear
standards necessary to establish a successful asylum claim. In addition,
the few evidentiary and other standards that have been established clearly
by published precedent or recent revisions to the administrative code are
[often] ignored by immigration judges in favor of outdated or overturned
standards. [Since] the vast majority of [asylum] cases are not appealed,
outdated procedures persist and dictate the outcome of most cases. [This
leaves the local IJ] with broad discretion [but] very little guidance regard-
ing the exercise of that discretion. 1
24
Hence, often justice will not prevail in many cases, particularly cases
involving sexual minorities and victims of gender based violence.
124. Id. See, e.g., Swink, supra note 40, at 264-65. Swink discusses an unpublished IJ
opinion in his possession that gave a "detailed analysis [of] the intersection of gender and
sexual orientation in Peru." Swink, supra note 40, at 265. The case was heard by an IJ in San
Francisco, and involved an asylum claim by a lesbian woman from Peru. Id. at 264.
In this case, the [claimant] had not come out as a lesbian while in Peru, but had
done so after developing a relationship with another woman while visiting the
United States. The Immigration Judge (IJ) described a "strong level of social op-
probrium against homosexuals in Peru, as well as a certain level of violence."
The IJ noted that "while homosexuality is legal in Peru," homosexuals are ex-
cluded from certain areas of employment and may be fired if their sexual orienta-
tion is revealed. This was the case for 117 foreign diplomats relieved of their po-
sitions by former President Alberto Fujimori, who also "referred to homosexuality
as a type of 'subversion' that the state needed to abolish." The [IJ] specifically
noted the significance of such anti-gay rhetoric from Peru's highest elected offi-
cial with regard to respondent's prospects for state protection: "President Fuji-
mori's negative words about homosexuals represented the Peruvian government's
antipathy for homosexuals and the lack of protection Respondent can expect if she
suffers persecution."
Id. Swink opines that:
[the] decision [in this case] is notable for its comprehensive assessment of the so-
cial situation of homosexuals, as a class, within Peru. After describing the hostile
economic and political climate, the [IJ] went on to discuss the centrality of the
Catholic Church in the Peruvian Constitution and the significance of religious an-
tipathy towards gays as it relates to the individual asylum seeker. Specifically,
the court noted that the asylum seeker in this case was "a devout Catholic" who
regularly attended church while growing up and with her partner while in the
United States. The court also discussed other forms of persecution to which ho-
mosexuals in Peru have been subject, most notably forced sterilization, violent ra-
ids on nightclubs, and uninvestigated attacks by a gang known as "The Fagkill-
ers."
Id. at 264-65. Although it is unclear whether there was a grant of asylum or with-
holding of removal, Swink is complimentary of the IJ in this case, because he or
she wrote such a "nuanced and detail-oriented analysis" of the facts and country
conditions in the analysis of this case. Id. at 264.
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C. Social Group
Among the problems in adjudicating asylum cases, "has been the shift-
ing scope of the 'particular social group' standard: in order to be eligible for
asylum, refugees must belong to a particular social group if they do not qual-
ify under" the other protected categories "of race, religion, nationality... or
political opinion." 125 We know that in 1994, the Attorney General desig-
nated the Toboso-Alfonso case as precedent for the proposition that homo-
sexuals, who had been persecuted in their country of origin, could be recog-
nized "as a particular social group... in all proceedings involving [issues of
persecution involving] the 'same issue or issues.', 126
Until 2001, there had been "two seemingly conflicting standards for de-
fining a 'particular social group."",127 The first was the standard which was
derived from the BIA in its 1985 case of In re Acosta.1 28 In Acosta, the BIA
upheld the IJ's denial of asylum to a thirty-six year old man from El Salva-
dor who was in deportation proceedings. 129 Among his claims for asylum
was the proposition that he was a member of "a particular social group" of
young taxi drivers, in the capital city of San Salvador, in the taxi cooperative
known as COTAXI, who feared persecution at the hands of guerrillas who
wanted to disrupt the public transportation system of the country.13 ° The
BIA held that:
"[P]articular social group"... mean[s] persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared cha-
racteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ....
or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such
as formerl mllilly lmadersip or IanU UwlISip. 1
125. Recent Case, Immigration Law-Asylum-Ninth Circuit Holds That Persecuted Ho-
mosexual Mexican Man with a Female Sexual Identity Qualifies for Asylum under Particular
Social Group Standard-Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), 114
HARv. L. REV. 2569, 2569 (2001) [hereinafter Recent Case].
126. Saxena, supra note 10, at 343. See also In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819,
820 (B.I.A. 1990).
127. Recent Case, supra note 125, at 2571.
128. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,233 (B.I.A. 1985). See also Recent Case, supra note 125, at
2570-71.
129. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 213.
130. Id. at 216-17, 232.
131. Id. at233.
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Acosta's claim for asylum on this ground was denied because his mem-
bership in a taxi cooperative was not an immutable trait. 132 The court indi-
cated that he could leave the cooperative, change jobs, and move to another
part of the country, and he would not be a possible target of guerilla persecu-
tion. 133  In 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the
Acosta standard in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 34 another case involving a
claimant from El Salvador who feared return to his homeland because he
might be drafted by the government there to fight against the guerillas. 135 In
deportation proceedings, Sanchez-Trujillo sought asylum on the ground that
he would be persecuted if deported to El Salvador on account of the fact that
he was a member "of a 'particular social group,' [to wit: a group] of young,
urban, working class males of military age who had never served in the mili-
tary or otherwise [supported] the government."'136 The court rejected his
claim of asylum and held that:
[T]he phrase "particular social group" implies a collection of peo-
ple closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some
common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of
a voluntary associational relationship among the purported mem-
bers, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamen-
tal to their identity as a member of that discrete social group.1
37
Hernandez-Montiel was a native of Mexico who filed for asylum on the
ground that he was persecuted in Mexico on account of his homosexuality
and his female sexual identity, a particular social group.'38 He testified at
trial "that, at the age of eight, he 'realized ... [he] was attracted to people of
[his] same sex' [and a]t the age of 12, [he] began dressing and behaving as a
woman. He faced numerous reprimands from family and school officials
because of his sexual orientation."' 39 He was also abused and sexually as-
saulted by Mexican police officers. 40 He subsequently "fled to the United
States."'' His asylum claim was denied by the IJ and his appeal was re-
132. Id. at 234.
133. Id. at 234, 236.
134. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
135. See id. at 1573.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1576 (emphasis omitted).
138. Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled by
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005).
139. Id. at 1087-88.
140. Id. at 1088.
141. Id.
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jected by the BIA. 142 "The BIA found that Hernandez-Montiel did not meet
his burden of 'establishing that the abuse he suffered [in Mexico] was be-
cause of his membership in a particular social group,' which [they] classified
as 'homosexual males who dress as females."' 143 The court concluded:
that the "tenor of [his] claim [was] that he was mistreated because
of the way he [was] dressed (as a male prostitute) and not because
he [was] a homosexual." [T]he BIA found that [he] failed to show
that "his decision to dress as a female was an immutable character-
istic., ,
144
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 145 re-
conciled the Acosta and the Sanchez-Trujillo definitions of a particular social
group into "one expansive standard, holding that a particular social group 'is
one united by a voluntary association ... or by an innate characteristic that is
so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members
either cannot or should not be required to change it. '146 "Hernandez-
Montiel [represents] an important development because it defines 'particular
social group' in a way that embraces individuals who are actually perse-
cuted-even if they fail to qualify for asylum under the statute's other enu-
merated categories."' 141 Such a standard "provides a mechanism that meets
the needs of those who do not fit neatly into a particular racial or religious
group, but who are [still] persecuted [on account] of something immutable or
fundamental to their persons."
148
The Ninth Circuit held that it was not just his dress that was critical for
the particular social group requirement. 149 Instead, the Court found that Her-
nandez-Montiel's female sexual identity was so basic to him that either he
could not chnnoe it or "rhe.l shnuldd not he reniiired to ohnnge rit] ," 50 The
€ -L---J .. . . . . .. . . "- _ --. . .. . L--j ...
implication of such a standard is readily apparent in asylum claims based on
sexual orientation or gender violence.
142. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1089.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1089-90.
145. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
146. Recent Case, supra note 125, at 2571 (quoting Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093
(emphasis omitted)).
147. Id. at 2573.
148. Id.
149. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094.
150. Id.
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Recent cases such as Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft5 ' and Molathwa v. Ash-
croft152 demonstrate, however, that despite the "particular social group"
claims, asylum may still be denied if there is not credible, and sometimes,
strong evidence of past persecution because of homosexual activity or abuse
for being a homosexual.'53 Insufficient evidence of past harassment or mis-
treatment by the government or the public will usually warrant a denial of
asylum. 1
54
151. 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
152. 390 F.3d 551 (8th Cir. 2004).
153. Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 787-88; Molathwa, 390 F.3d at 554. "Luis Reyes-Reyes, a
citizen of El Salvador, fled to the United States as a teenager .. ." Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at
785. He lived in this country for twenty-five years until placed in removal proceedings. Id.
"Reyes is a homosexual male with a female... identity. He dresses and looks like a woman,
wearing makeup and a woman's hairstyle .... [He] has not undergone sex reassignment sur-
gery, [but] has... characteristically female ... mannerisms and gestures ...." Id. "When
[he] was thirteen and living with his [parents] in San Salvador, he was kidnaped [sic] by a
group of men, taken to a remote location in the mountains, and raped and beaten because of
his homosexual orientation. Reyes's attackers threatened future brutality if he reported their
[activity]." Id. He never did until his removal proceedings. Id. The IJ denied his claim for
asylum on the ground that it was not timely filed, that is, within one year from the date of
April 1, 1997. Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785. The IJ also found that he "failed to state that
anyone in the government or acting on behalf of the government tortured him." Id. The BIA
affirmed the IJ denial. Id. at 786. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found it lacked juris-
diction to overturn the denial of asylum because of the late filing, but remanded the case to the
BIA to determine whether he was eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture or
withholding of removal. See id. at 789.
154. See id.; Molathwa, 390 F.3d at 554. "[Mareko] Molathwa, a native of Botswana,
entered the United States ... as a nonimmigrant visitor." Id. at 552. He overstayed his visa
and was placed in removal proceedings. Id. He filed a claim for asylum testifiing that "he
had been married" in Botswana, but that his wife divorced him when he entered into
a romantic relationship with another man, Berger Hartlebrakke .... [W]hile Molathwa and
Berger were living together in Botswana, police officers entered [their] apartment without a
warrant. The police.., said they were doing "routine checks" for drugs, but never searched
the apartment for drugs. Molathwa claim[ed] the incident was merely a pretext to harass him
and Berger because of their sexual orientation.
Id. A number of his friends in Botswana experienced beatings, arrest and jailing for several
days "for engaging in homosexual activity;" one of these men subsequently committed suicide
due to the "disgrace from being exposed as a homosexual." Id. Although Molathwa, a teach-
er, suspected that people in Botswana "knew he was a homosexual, he never experienced...
problems at work." Molathwa, 390 F.3d at 552. He feared being returned to Botswana be-
cause in Botswana "homosexuals are blamed for ... AIDS, and for natural disasters;" he
feared that "others would beat him to death to save Botswana from epidemics." Id. The IJ
denied his claim of asylum. Id. at 553. The BIA affirmed. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied his petition for review, even though the court assumed, for purposes of his
appeal, that "homosexuals are a particular social group eligible for relief." Id at 553-54. The
court found that Molathwa had not proven that "it was more likely than not [that] he would be
subject to persecution in Botswana" because the "warrantless entry into [his] apartment ...
was an isolated event and did not involve violence, threats, intimidation... or even a search."
[Vol. 32
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Despite the Kasinga decision, discussed in the introduction of this arti-
cle, which designated FGM a form of persecution and found that young
Togolese women who had not undergone such process and opposed it could
be "a particular social group," claims by women seeking asylum as a result
of gender based violence have not always fared well. In 1995, a Guatemalan
woman, R.A., sought asylum in the United States.'55 She had fled her coun-
try to escape a husband who for years had abused her, beaten her, kicked her
in her vagina, raped and sodomized her, and had threatened to kill her.'56
The police would not help her.'57 The IJ found her testimony credible and
granted asylum on the grounds that she was a member of a "particular social
group of 'Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Gua-
temalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination.""5 " The IJ "found that such a group was cognizable and cohe-
sive, as members shared the common and immutable characteristics of gen-
der and the experience of having been intimately involved with a male com-
panion who practice[ed] male domination through violence."' 59  The BIA
reversed this decision and the reversal was affirmed by the Attorney Gen-
eral. 6  The BIA held that "'Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are
to live under male domination' [are] not a particular social group." 161 "Ab-
sent from this group's makeup is 'a voluntary associational relationship' that
is of 'central concern' in the Ninth Circuit."'' 62
Earlier, in 1990, a Salvadoran woman had been denied asylum as not
being in a cognizable particular social group. 163 "[Carmen] Gomez was born
Molathwa. 390 F.3d at 554. Further he had never been charged with a crime or detained hv
police. Id.
155. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 2001).
156. Id. at 908.
157. Id. at 909.
158. Id. at911.
159. Id.
160. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 927-28.
161. Id. at911.
162. Id. at 917 (citing Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1996)); The court also found:
[T]hat the respondent has been the victim of tragic and severe spouse abuse. We further find
that her husband's motivation, to the extent it can be ascertained, has varied; some abuse oc-
curred because of his warped perception of and reaction to her behavior, while some likely
arose out of psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all.... [w]e are
not persuaded that the abuse occurred because of her membership in a particular social group
or because of an actual or imputed political opinion. We therefore do not find respondent eli-
gible for asylum.
Id. at 927.
163. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1991).
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in El Salvador and" lived there until she was eighteen.' 1 "Between the ages
of twelve [to] fourteen [she] was raped and beaten by guerilla forces on [each
of] five... occasions."' 65 After living in the United States for almost a dec-
ade, she pled guilty to a "sale of a controlled substance," served time in jail,
and was placed in deportation proceedings. 166 She claimed asylum on the
ground of fear of persecution because she was a member of a particular so-
cial group: "women who have been previously battered and raped by Salva-
doran guerillas."' 167  The IJ denied her claim of asylum. 68  The BIA af-
firmed. 169  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed her petition on
the grounds that "Gomez failed to produce evidence that women who have
previously been abused by the guerillas possess common characteristics-
other than gender and youth-such that would-be persecutors could identify
them as members of the purported group." 1
70
There have been several recent cases, cited below, wherein women who
have been subjected to gender based violence have been granted asylum on
the grounds that they were members of a particular social group, or on other
grounds found in their cases. 171
164. Id. at 662.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 663-64.
168. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 664. The court further held:
Indeed, there is no indication that Gomez will be singled out for further brutalization on this
basis. Certainly, we do not discount the physical and emotional pain that has been wantonly
inflicted on these Salvadoran women. Moreover, we do not suggest that women who have
been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by particular attackers cannot assert a well
founded fear of persecution. We cannot, however, find that Gomez has demonstrated that she
is more likely to be persecuted than any other young woman.
Id
171. See, e.g., Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, a Bulgarian
woman claimed asylum based on past persecution on an account that she was sexually as-
saulted by a state security officer, which caused her to flee Bulgaria. Id. at 783. The Seventh
Circuit vacated and remanded her BIA denial of asylum on the ground that she may have been
persecuted because of her Macedonian nationality. Id. See also Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2000). In Shoafera, the claimant, an Ethiopian woman of Amharic ethnicity,
petitioned for review of her denial of asylum by the BIA. 228 F.3d at 1072. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that her rape by a government official of Tigrean ethnicity, who was her boss, was
motivated at least in part by the applicant's Amharic ethnicity, and that she was persecuted on
account of her nationality and remanded the case to the BIA. Id. at 1072, 1076. See also
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003) (involving a claim of asylum by a twenty-
eight year old woman from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where she was raped and
imprisoned by soldiers during that country's civil war in 2000). The Third Circuit in Zubeda
vacated and remanded the BIA's order denying asylum and withholding of asylum providing
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IV. RECENT CASES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing demonstrates that the United States continues to be a
country which will accept and give asylum to those who flee persecution in
their homelands, even if that persecution is a result of sexual orientation or
gender based violence against women. It is apparent that not all LGBT per-
sons or abused women obtain asylum status, but from a human rights point
of view, we remain a safe haven where people of all sexual orientations can
seek justice if they believe they have been persecuted.
The lack of precedent and the discretionary power of IJ's in asylum cas-
es, and the other aforementioned problems with adjudication, make it diffi-
cult to readily predict how such cases may be decided before filing.172 This
may be by design because many asylum seekers are not represented by coun-
sel. 173
Nevertheless, practitioners who do file claims for affirmative asylum or
who represent claimants already in removal proceedings, are best advised to
work to insure their efforts of gaining asylum for those they do represent. In
this regard, it is advisable that counsel work with the claimant to prepare an
affidavit which recounts the claimant's background and recounts in detail
each instance of persecution encountered in the country of origin. 174 At-
tached to the affidavit should be as much documentary evidence as possi-
ble-relevant to the claim of asylum and that will support the claimant's
position-such as newspaper articles, photographs, hospital reports, and any
evidence one can discover on the country of origin's conditions and how that
country treats LGBT persons.' 75 This section will examine two recent cases
concerning gender based violence and sexual orientation, respectively, and
may be helpful to practitioners and scholars interested in asylum law.
A. Deqa AhmadHaji Ai
As recounted earlier in this article, Deqa Ahmad Haji Ali was a Somali
woman who was granted asylum in the United States in 2005.176 Her story is
only a minimal analysis of Zubeda's claims of degrading treatment or punishment under the
Convention Against Torture. 333 F.3d at 478-80.
172. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 3, at 980.
173. Id. at 1026.
174. Id. at 981.
175. See id. at 1021.
176. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 2005).
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filled with instances of cruelty, anguish, and redemption.'77 "After two
merit[] hearings, the IJ issued an oral decision... denying" the asylum re-
quest. 178  The IJ found her ineligible for asylum on the ground that "she
failed to establish past persecution on account of a protected basis" as re-
quired by the statute. 179  "Instead, the IJ [ruled] that the sole motivation for
the murder, detention, and robbery . . . 'was shown to clearly be simply to
steal, and in the case of the rape to take gratification from the helpless condi-
tion of the respondent.""9980  "The BIA affirmed the IJ without [a written]
opinion."' i81
It is not completely clear whether Ali had sought asylum at the hearing
level on the ground of her nationality-as a member of the Muuse Diriiye
177. See id. at 782-83. Ms. Ali "was born in Berbera, a northern Somali city." Id. at 782.
Somalia society is made up of a number of clans and sub-clans. Id. There is no functioning
central civil government in the country. See id.
[She] is a member of the Muuse Diriiye clan, which is referred to pejoratively as the Midgan
clan. Muuse Diriiye clan members are bound in servitude to noble Somali families and are
considered low-caste and subhuman by other Somali clans .... Traditionally, the Muuse Di-
riiye had no rights to engage in political activities or undertake political work, but under the
presidency of Mohammed Siad Barre they were allowed to assume political positions for the
first time. [The] opening of civil service positions to a non-noble clan angered higher-status
clans, including members of the United Somali Congress (USC) militia that ousted Siad Barre
in a civil war in 1991.
Ali, 394 F.3d at 782. Siad Barre fled Somalia and clan warfare has continued to rage there.
Id.
[Ali's] husband, Ahmed Omar Osman .... [is] also a member of the Muuse Diriiye clan, [and]
worked for the Ministry of Education under the administration of President Mohammed Siad
Barre. In early January 1991, six armed members of the USC militia broke into Ali's home
around sunrise. Ali recognized one of the intruders as a neighbor who knew that Ali's husband
worked for Siad Barre. Ali was brutally gang-raped by three of these armed men while her
husband and brother-in-law were bound and forced to watch. While they were raping Ali, the
persecutors called Ali and her family "Midgans [sic] traitor" and told her she was "getting
what [she] deserved" because she and her family were Muuse Diriiye, who were not supposed
to advance in society, while the militia, members of higher-class clans, "were supposed to have
everything .... When Ali's brother in law cursed and spit on the militia for raping her, he was
shot dead in front of her."
Id. at 782-83.
The militia also looted Ali's home, taking everything of value and destroying her household
decorations. After raping Ali, the militia took her husband with them and said "let Siad Barre
save you now .... We came back to our country, you Midgan you have everything, but now
we are in power and Siad Barre is gone." Ali's two sons, age eight and nine at the time, were
in another room of the family home during these brutal rapes and murder.
Id. at 783. "Osman was released from detention by the militia after two weeks, and came
home with broken ribs and wrists. Upon his release, Ali, Osman, and their sons immediately
fled to Ethiopia." Id. Upon arriving in Ethiopia, Osman divorced Ali because she had been
raped. Ali, 394 F.3d at 783.
178. Id. at 784.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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clan, on account of her being in a particular social group-as a Midgan
woman raped by USC militia members, upon an imputed political opinion, or
upon all of these grounds. 82 In a noteworthy opinion, the Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed with the IJ opinion that stated that she was not persecuted on account
of one of the statutory grounds. 183 The court reversed the BIA and ruled that
she had, in fact, suffered "past persecution on account of two protected
grounds: 1) her political opinion; and 2) her membership in a particular so-
cial group."'8
The court ruled that "[a]lthough the USC militia was not the ruling gov-
ernment in Somalia, its actions... [were] appropriately... considered per-
secution" because "groups seeking to overthrow a government can be non-
state agents of persecution for asylum purposes."' 85 "The USC [had been]
involved in the overthrow of the Siad Barre administration."'' 86 The court
saw that her persecution had been "on account of the political opinion [they]
believed she held and [as a member of] a particular social group, her clan."' 187
Here, the court seems to be mixing the protected classes in an unusual way.
In other cases we have seen claimants attempting to delineate themselves as
a particular social group such as: "young women [that] are members of the
Tchamba-Kunsutu tribe of Northern Togo, who have not been subjected to
[FGM] ... and who oppose the practice,"' 188 or "Guatemalan women who
have been [abused by] male companions [that] believe women are to live
under male domination,"'' 89 or "women who have been ...battered and
raped by Salvadoran guerillas" in the past and who fear such future persecu-
tion.' 90 In the instant case, the court rolls it all into one concept expressing
the notion that Ali's particular cognizable social group would be all members
of the Muuse Diriiye who were helped by Siad Barre, and would have politi-
cal opinions different from that of the USC and other clans that believe that
the Muuse Diriiye should not rise in society. 1' 1 This is a novel approach to
finding persecution on both political opinion and particular social group
grounds.
182. See Ali, 394 F.3d at 784-85.
183. Id. at 785.
184. Id. at 787.
185. Id. at 785.
186. Id.
187. Ali, 394 F.3d at 785.
188. Juncker, supra note 18, at 259 (quoting In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357,
357 (B.I.A. 1996)).
189. In re R-A-, 22I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (B.I.A. 2001).
190. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Lieberman, supra note
17, at 9-10.
191. SeeAli, 394 F.3d at 783,786.
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The court relied heavily on the words said to Ali by her persecutors dur-
ing her rape to determine that there was a political motivation to their ac-
tions.192 Their words included statements such as: she was a "Midgans [sic]
traitor" and that she was "getting what [she] deserved because she and her
family were ... not supposed to advance in society" since they were Muuse
Diriiye; and finally, "let Siad Barre save you now .... We came back to our
country, you Midgan you have everything, but now we are in power and Siad
Barre is gone."'
193
The Ninth Circuit court also found that the IJ was incorrect when it held
that the rape was for sexual gratification. 94 The court held that "[s]erious
physical harm consistently has been held to constitute persecution. Rape and
other forms of severe sexual violence clearly can fall [into] this rule."' 95
This particular rule was from a 1995 memorandum to all INS and asylum
officers adjudicating claims from women. 196 Either the IJ had not read this
important memorandum or ignored it.
Among the implications that we may draw from this case on asylum
claims for women who are victims of gender based violence, is that IJ's may
not have read the literature, regulations, and memoranda that would help
them to justly and properly adjudicate cases that come before them. Thus,
the attorney bringing such claims must be up to date on such literature, regu-
lations, and memoranda concerning adjudicating claims by women and take
them to the hearing and make them known to the IJ during the hearing or at
sidebar. Another implication that comes from Ali is the obvious one: the
claimant may have more than one statutory ground upon which persecution
can be founded. 19 7 In Ali, there were both political opinion and particular
social group grounds. 198 It should become a mantra to often be repeated by
those who do political asylum work that the five grounds are: race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or a member of a particular social group. 99
One should attempt to help the claimant determine as many grounds as pos-
sible for which the claimant may have been, or will be, persecuted.
192. Id. at 786.
193. Id. at 783 (alterations in original) (quotations omitted).
194. Id. at 787.
195. Id. (citing Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to ALL INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators, Considerations for Asylum
Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter Coven Memo-
randum]) (quotations omitted).
196. See Coven Memorandum, supra note 195.
197. SeeAli, 394 F.3d at 784-85.
198. See id. at 785.
199. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000)).
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An example might be that of the Ethiopian citizen of Oromo nationality
who was persecuted by the Ethiopian government for seeking better political
rights for the Oromo people.0° She claimed persecution on account of the
fact that she was persecuted: 1) because of her nationality, that is her Oromo
nationality; 2) because of her religion in that she was a Muslim in a majority
Christian country; and 3) on account of her political opinion, the fact she
opposed the Ethiopian government because for years most Ethiopians viewed
the Oromo as the "slave" caste of Ethiopia, much like the Muuse Diriiye are
viewed in Somalia. 20
The final implication that may be drawn from Ali is that this same result
might not have been obtained if the case had been brought in a circuit other
than the Ninth Circuit.20 2 Although the facts of Ali are compelling, and it is
natural to believe that such a case warranted a grant of asylum, this may not
have been the case if this had been heard by the Fifth Circuit, where the per-
secution must be performed with a "punitive intent., 203 Were the six USC
militia men who broke into Ali's home, raped her, shot her brother in law,
and stole their belongings acting to punish her?2° The words of the milita
men could be so construed to understand that they were punishing her for
trying to rise in society. However, the "punitive intent" requirement of the
Fifth Circuit could well allow a DHS attorney in the Fifth Circuit to argue
that this was nothing more than a rape and burglary done for sexual gratifica-
tion and pecuniary gain, and not a punitive act of persecution because of
political opinion or social group, since the words of the militia men were
nothing more than harassment of a helpless victim.
B. Nasser Mustapha Karouni
The Karouni case is also a Ninth Circuit case from 2005, and involved
an "outed" gay, Shi'ite Muslim man from Lebanon afflicted with HIV, who
was able to show that his fear of future persecution was well founded. 25 The
200. This example derives from an actual case in which the author represented an asylum
claimant from Ethiopia who was awarded asylum on the ground that she was persecuted on
account of her nationality, religion, and political opinion. The opinion was unpublished in the
matter of Roman H. Abadir, A 29 015 236 (1995).
201. Id.
202. Compare Ali, 394 F.3d at 780, with Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir.
1997), Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 193 (5th Cir. 1994), and Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d
161, 166 (7th Cir. 1992).
203. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 646.
204. SeeAli, 394 F.3d at 782-83.
205. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1165-6 (9th Cir. 2005). "Karouni is a native
and citizen of Lebanon who [legally] entered the United States in 1987," and was placed in
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IJ denied his claim for asylum on the ground that Karouni had not estab-
lished past persecution on account of his homosexuality and held with re-
spect to future persecution "that Karouni's testimony was 'full of supposition
and devoid of supporting facts.'"206 "The IJ [also] found that Karouni failed
to provide evidence to corroborate that Hizballah militants" had shot Karou-
ni's cousin, "Khalil, in the anus and later [had murdered] him., 27  Karouni
appealed "to the BIA, which... summarily affirmed the IJ.
20 8
The Ninth Circuit held that the IJ's findings concerning the facts of Ka-
rouni's case were not supported by substantial evidence. 20 9  The court dis-
puted the notion that Karouni should have corroborated the evidence of the
shooting in the anus-and later the murder of Khalil-by reminding us that:
"[t]he testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the
removal proceedings. Id. at 1166. At his hearing he sought asylum because he feared "perse-
cut[ion] if removed to Lebanon because he [was] a homosexual, suffering from AIDS, and
Shi'ite.... Karouni [had grown] up in the southern Lebanese province of Tyre," a region that
is "controlled by an Islamic paramilitary organization named 'Hizballah."' Id. "Hizballah
applies Islamic law in [the] areas [it] control[s]." Id. at 1166-67 (internal citations omitted).
"Under Islamic law, homosexuality ... according to Karouni, [is a crime] 'punishable by
death."' Id. at 1167.
Karouni stated in his asylum application that he has "always been gay." As a youth in the late-
1970s, [he and his cousin Khaleil] spent time together secretly meeting other gay men. Some-
time between the late-1970's and 1984, Khaleil's family learned that Khaleil was gay and os-
tracized him. In 1984, Khaleil was shot in the anus at his apartment, apparently by the Hizz-
ballah because he was gay. Khaleil survived the injuries but, in 1986, was shot to death at his
apartment, again apparently by the Hizballah. Karouni has also been the subject of anti-gay
animus. In Fall 1984, two men armed with machine guns, "dressed in military garb," and iden-
tifying themselves as members of the Amal Militia, interrogated and attempted to arrest Ka-
rouni at his apartment after they learned that Karouni had been involved in a homosexual rela-
tionship with a man named Mahmoud. [He was] told to confess to the crime of homosexuality
[and was asked] to name other homosexuals. [He] "feigned ignorance." An armed neighbor
and friend of Karouni's interrupted the encounter and prevented the militia-men from arresting
Karouni. Mahmoud was not as fortunate as Karouni: he was arrested and beaten by Amal mi-
litia-men and Karouni never saw him again. Karouni believe[d] that Mahmoud told ... au-
thorities that Karouni is gay. After Karouni's encounter with the militia-men.., he avoided
his apartment for [two] months and started "playing a straight life" by dating women. In 1987,
shortly after Khaleil's murder, Karouni finally fled Lebanon for the United States. [He was
compelled to return twice to see his dying father in 1992, and in 1996, to visit his mother who
was ill. In his 1992 visit to Lebanon, he attended a handful of dinner parties with other homo-
sexuals. After his return to the U.S. he learned] that at least three of the friends with whom he
[had] dined were arrested, detained, beaten, and/or killed because they were gay. One of these
friends, Andre Baladi, was arrested by... police because he [was] gay. [He] was jailed, bea-
ten, and interrogated for names of other homosexuals... Karouni learned that during the inter-
rogation, Baladi "outed" Karouni as a gay man ... Karouni fears ... he would be identified
and persecuted for having associated with these homosexual friends [if removed to Lebanon].
Karouni, 399 F.3d. at 1167-69.
206. Id. at 1169.
207. Id. at 1173.
208. Id. at 1169.
209. Id. at 1173-74.
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burden of proof without corroboration.,2 " The court found that through his
own testimony Karouni had presented substantial evidence that Hizballah
had a military presence in his region of the country, and "that homosexuality
[was] punishable by death," and that "state officials have arrested, beaten,
and in some cases killed known or suspected homosexuals. ' ' 1 In particular,
at his hearing "Karouni submitted [as evidence] a BIA opinion from a similar
immigration case involving a Lebanese homosexual, in which Muslim mili-
tia-men repeatedly forced the barrel of a rifle into the homosexual asylum-
seeker's anus. 212
This last point underscores the need for those who represent asylum
seekers to file with the application for asylum, or submit as evidence prior to
the hearing to the immigration court, all relevant authority, such as BIA
opinions, circuit decisions, regulations and other documentary evidence that
will help strengthen the claimant's case. An advocate should not presume
that the IJ will be aware of all aspects of asylum law.
"The IJ faulted Karouni for failing to provide evidence to corroborate
that he had been identified as a homosexual to the authorities by either his
former homosexual partner, Mahmoud, or the friends with whom he attended
dinner parties in... 1992."13 The court disagreed, finding that
Karouni did not speculate that he [had] been identified to the au-
thorities .. .[r]ather, Karouni testified that his friend and Mah-
moud's cousin.., told him that his name had been submitted to
the authorities as a homosexual. The IJ [had ruled] that Karouni
should have obtained affidavits from [the cousin] or other friends.
214
Again, the court reminds us that when an applicant presents credible testi-
mony "[n]o further corroboration is required., 215
In another finding the IJ "found that Karouni's return[] to Lebanon in
1992 to attend to his dying father and in 1996 to attend to his dying mother
'cut against' his claim of fear of future persecution [since such] actions '[did]
not appear to be the actions of [one] who fear[ed] persecution because he
[was] gay. '"' 216 The Ninth Circuit dispatched with this finding, stating that
210. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1174 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a)) (quotations omitted). See
also Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998).
211. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1174.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1175.
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2000)).
216. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1175.
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Karouni's stays in Lebanon on both occasions were short and that the court
found no fault with Karouni going "to see his parents one last time., 217 The
IJ found that such trips "constitute[d] substantial evidence that [Karouni's]
fear of persecution was not well-founded., 218 Concerning the IJ's conclusion
that Karouni's fear was not well founded, the Ninth Circuit appropriately
held this to be "'personal conjecture' about what choice someone in Karou-
ni's unfortunate position would have" done.219 "An [IJ's] personal conjec-
ture 'cannot be substituted for objective and substantial evidence.' ' 220 In
sum, the court reversed the IJ and the BIA's finding, instead concluding that
Karouni had "both a subjectively and objectively well-founded fear of future
persecution" if removed to Lebanon.221
The implications of Karouni, for those who seek justice in immigration
court for LGBT persons, are not as varied as those set out after Ali. As a
result of In re Toboso-Alfonso, there is no need to prove that homosexuals
are "a particular social group" under the statute.222 There are no circuit splits
and the concept of "punitive intent" normally does not have to be proven.223
If the case had been brought in the Fifth Circuit, Karouni's petition for re-
view may have been denied because of the fact that he had never been ar-
rested or jailed for being a homosexual and that he had only been accosted
by the Amal militia men on one occasion, and for only a brief amount of
time.224 In other words, there may not have been much evidence of persecu-
tion on account of his homosexuality. Some observers might describe Ka-
rouni as not being "gay enough" for the government because he could cover
his homosexuality and should not fear future persecution in Lebanon.225
The greater implication that we may draw from Karouni is that there is
often much insensitivity in immigration courts, and too often asylum claim-
ants encounter IJ's who are hostile to many of the cases they hear. 26 Such
hostility may be the result of managing an overly burdensome daily docket,
or it may result from racism, sexism, homophobia, or a belief that the testi-
mony and facts are contrived or fabricated. Those who represent claimants
in asylum cases must understand that such hostility may not be overcome at
217. Id. at 1176.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Paramasamy v. Ashcroft 295 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir 2002)).
221. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1178-79.
222. Saxena, supra note 10, at 343.
223. See, e.g., Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1997).
224. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1168. See also Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir.
1994).
225. See Morgan, supra note 37, at 146.
226. See, e.g., Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the IJ level, but the representative must walk into the hearing with as strong a
case as possible and armed with as much corroborative evidence as possible,
if available. The representative needs to be aware of relevant prior decisions,
current regulations, and rules.
The greatest implication that may be drawn from Karouni, is the rule
concerning credibility. If the testimony of the claimant is credible, corrobo-
ration is not required to prove a well-founded fear of persecution.227 Thus,
the claimant must know her case, must be truthful about her case, and testify
in such a way to make the record show that the claimant believes her own
case. There must be extensive preparation.
V. CONCLUSION
There have been great advances in our immigration laws that protect
LGBT persons and women who may have been victims of gender based vio-
lence. Earlier immigration law legally "excluded lesbian[] and gay men be-
cause .. .the medical and psychiatric communities[] belie[ved] . . . homo-
sexuality was a disease." 228 We, as a country, are to be commended for now
extending grants of political asylum to those who may have experienced past
persecution, or who fear future persecution in their country of origin because
of their sexual orientation or victimization on account of gender violence.
Grants of political asylum on account of such persecution recognize the basic
human rights that all human beings deserve. Recent statistics reveal that
grants of asylum are increasing, including such grants for persecution on
account of sexual orientation or gender based violence.229
Asylum is a legal remedy available to legal and illegal aliens who seek
protection from persecution in their country of origin "on account of race,
religion, nationality," political opinion, or being a member of "a particular
social group. '230 Thus, not all immigrants are protected from persecution.
Yet, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. We have no definition of
"persecution" or "particular social group" in the statute.231 Many of the defi-
nitions come from BIA or circuit court opinions. The circuits are sometimes
split on their definitions of these words "persecution" and "particular social
group." The definitions are specific to those particular circuits. Some cir-
cuits, like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, require that there be a "punitive
227. Morgan, supra note 37, at 141.
228. Bennett, supra note 6, at 279.
229. See Morgan, supra note 37, at 141-43.
230. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (2000).
231. See id
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intent" motivating the persecutor before asylum be granted.232 What is
needed is for the United States Supreme Court to set some kind of standard
that would reconcile and harmonize these definitions and make them uniform
for all immigration courts and the BIA. It is unlikely that this will happen.
Immigration cases seldom reach the Supreme Court because so few immigra-
tion cases dealing with asylum are appealed at all. The Attorney General
could well designate more cases as precedent for certain grants of asylum.233
A review of the Ali and Karouni cases reveal that I's need better knowledge,
training, and sensitivity in order to justly adjudicate the asylum cases that
they hear.
Generally, the immigration service, now under the auspices of DHS, has
written regulations for interpreting the immigration laws, but this is a slow
and bureaucratic process. Some IJ's appear to ignore some of the regulations
which already exist. In order to refine and harmonize our immigration rules
and regulations for asylum, it would be best for an outside and disinterested
group to set about accomplishing this task. The American Law Institute
(ALI) would be the perfect group to become involved with such a project.
ALl was first formed in 1923, and included American judges, lawyers, and
legal scholars who would address uncertainty in the law.131 Over the years
the work of the ALI has resulted in studies by scholars and experts in certain
fields of the law who have provided "restatement[s] of basic legal subjects
that... tell judges and lawyers what the law [means]."235
DHS should authorize the ALI to study the problems with respect to
grants of political asylum and produce a restatement or codification upon
which IJ's, practitioners, and law teachers could rely with respect to grants of
asylum. The ALI has already worked with the American Bar Association
(ABA) to produce course study materials for the American Immigration
Lawyers Association. 236 A codification project for political asylum would be
a logical and valuable ALI-ABA project.
232. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994).
233. Saxena, supra note 10 at 343.
234. Am. Law Inst., About the American Law Institute, http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
235. Id.
236. Marshall L. Cohen, Obtaining Political Asylum After Physically Entering the US.,
SC38 ALI-ABA 75 (1998).
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